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That elusive Rusbridger CrossTechCrunch reports on the continuing decline of revenues in US newspapers – down $5bn since the start of 2008 compared to 2007. Even online revenues are falling. The “Rusbridger Cross” that was meant to see online revenues rise to compensate for print declines, is looking compromised in the US market. All of this matters a great deal to journalism -- “quality” journalism has, I have argued, always been cross subsidised inside the newspaper. As the fat goes, so will the recipients of cross-subsidy. I asked David Elstein, well-known media executive and watcher, how the US picture related to what was happening in the UK. Things are even worse here for the commercial sector, he says. Much of this is due to the BBC's dominance. All the more important to understand, then, what the BBC, by its nature, cannot do. Here is David's reply in full: “The US position is largely reflected in the UK. Regional newspaper revenues are particularly hard hit, and companies like Johnston Press and Trinity Mirror have suffered massive drops in value (94% and 89% respectively). That is why Ofcom and the BBC Trust were so emphatic in rejecting the BBC's plan to add video to local news websites. National newspapers are also suffering revenue declines, but are mostly shielded by parent company finances - even then, thousands of jobs are being cut, and some titles are vulnerable - notably The Independent, which has just run for shelter under Associated's roof. The recession is simply amplifying the long-term drift of ad revenue from print to on-line. Advertiser- funded television is in serious trouble. Ad rates are back down to 1992 levels, but total ad revenue is still in decline, despite TV viewing levels being seemingly unaffected by online activity. However, much of this damage to ad revenues is self-inflicted. The CRR (Contracts Rights Renewal) mechanism that ITV invented five years ago in order to get the merger of Granada and Carlton through the competition authorities effectively torpedoed the commercial TV market-place. Put simply, it allowed advertisers to reduce their spend percentages committed to ITV (typically, 70% of total budget) year by year in direct relationship to ITV's reduction in delivery of commercial impacts (ie total number of 30-second spots viewed in commercial breaks) - an entirely predictable reduction in a world with ever-growing multi-channel viewing share. ITV's suicidal policy at first appealed to competitors like Channel Four and five, imagining that revenue leaving ITV would turn up in their pockets, but what actually happened was that advertisers found that the impacts they had been buying from ITV at top of the market prices could be bought much more cheaply elsewhere - so revenue simply drifted out of TV. In this, the UK was unique - all similar markets saw an average 22% rise in cost per thousand (CPT) over the last five years, whilst the UK suffered an 11% decline. As I said, we are now back to 1992 CPT, but still cannot pull back the advertisers. What adds to the pressure on ITV in particular is the guaranteed strength of the BBC, which prevents ITV from cutting its spend on programmes (till now, anyway - rumours are it will be cut by over 10% next year), so leaving it with the lowest operating margins of all similar operators in Europe and the US. Commercial radio is in similarly poor condition, as the BBC inexorably increases its share of viewing off the back of a massively larger programming budget. However much we love the BBC, it is increasingly hard to deny the displacement effect of the BBC's strength. This was well-demonstrated by the 2005 Ofcom Public Service Broadcasting Review, which (without acknowledging such) showed that the high GDP territories with the highest GDP share spent on public broadcasting (the UK and Germany) had the lowest ratio of private spending on broadcasting (1:1), whereas the US, with low public spending, had an 8:1 ratio (ie 8 times as much spent on private broadcasting as on public). Other West European economies filled the space in between, with a steadily corresponding increase in ratio as the proportion of GDP spent on public broadcasting declined. In the UK, this effect is felt by commercial TV, local newspapers and commercial radio, and it is exacerbating the exogenous impact of online growth and economic recession. All in all, a nightmare scenario. And here is a clarification from David about the link between the CCR and declining revenues for Channels 4 and 5, who should have done well out of the arrangement: The old pre-CRR system had allowed ITV's two sales houses (Carlton and Granada) to use the dominant position of ITV in their respective regions to push up the proportion of advertiser budgets that they could ask be committed to ITV (but not necessarily to either sales house) if they wanted guaranteed exposure on the most powerful ad medium at preferred rates. Each sales house had less than 30% of the total market, so there was no basis for competition authorities to intervene. As the total number of commercial impacts being delivered by ITV was dropping (thanks to multi-channel spread), the effective ITV CPT rose, and ITV collectively enjoyed a growing CPT premium (15%+) over TV generally. Channel 4 (the next most important TV outlet) coat-tailed ITV, and also flourished (though much of its surplus was frittered away on staff, salaries and loss-making new ventures). When Carlton and Granada combined their sales houses at the time of their merger (against the strong advice of many commentators, including me), the advertisers persuaded the Competition Commission that this would allow abuse of a dominant position. So ITV volunteered CRR, whereby the guaranteed proportion of spend could fall in line with ITV1's loss of impacts (note: ITV1, not all ITV channels combined - as ITV put more resource into its digital channels, in order to hold up total ITV viewing, it actually shifted impacts away from ITV1). As advertisers discovered this new freedom, instead of buying their non-ITV impacts at premium prices, they could buy these make-weight impacts at 40% or 50% less, on five or multi-channel. They could also move the money out of TV altogether. The effect of this was briefly to increase revenues for Channel 4 and five, but with total spend on TV declining, and total impacts increasing (thanks to most digital channels being advertiser funded), average CPT dropped, and the market leader no longer had the leverage to reverse the trend. Once CPT drops, it becomes evident that buyers have much more power. Add to this the shift to online and recessionary pressures (felt very early by the TV advertising market) and CPT rates have ended up at 1992 levels, but are still not sufficiently attractive to pull money away from other media and back into TV. In other similar territories, where no such artificial division of a dominant broadcaster's sales effort had existed, the main commercial channels have been able to defend - and improve - their positions over the years. Thus even in Germany, where the market leaders - RTL and ProSiebenSatEins - have over 80% of the market, there is no regulatory intervention as the two are seen to be in competition with each other. To avoid being shut out of nearly half the market (or being unable to buy ads at favoured rates) advertisers typically commit to both broadcasters. As I said, in comparable territories, CPT has risen by 22% in the last five years. ITV1's audience share has been in steady decline since 1992 (from 38% to 18%), but for most of that time its total revenue (and therefore CPT) rose, as it leveraged its continuing leading position in the commercial marketplace. Only since CRR has this phenomenon come to a painful end. David Post new comment |
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opendemocracy said:
Tue, 2008-12-02 13:43It strikes me that the German example may, in fact, be a classic case of a duopoly carving up a market and maintaining high prices in the face of a tough environment in a quasi-collusive arrangement.
It may well be that Carlton and Granada, pre-merger, were doing more or less that.
What seems even clearer, though, is that where the BBC is such a dominat player, increasing the competition amongst the rest of the market will probably not increase competition overall -- a classic case of "second best".
Did anyone try arguing that to the competition authorities at the time of the merger?
Tony